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REVISITING GENDER-INCLUSIVE GOD-TALK: 






Though academic debate over gender-inclusive God-talk seems 
to have fizzled, the issue is a pressing one within many Christian 
denominations today—both within and outside the Church—and 
for that reason deserves to be briefly revisited. Accordingly, although 
in this essay we approach the issue as professional philosophers, our 
focus is on the life of the Church—more specifically, those no doubt 
sizable segments of the Church for which a personal God and Satan 
exist and evangelism matters. Running an elimination argument, we 
contend that if a certain sort of feminist concern about traditional 
God-talk is well-directed, the best response is to speak of not only 
God but also Satan in both masculine and feminine terms. And 
in closing, we address the possible worry that this response to the 
God-talk problem would not be Christian enough. 
I
Our thesis is this: If, as it has been common enough to think, presenting 
God as exclusively masculine does injustice to women in the Church—
injustice of a sort we will describe in the next section below—the best 
corrective is to speak of not only God but also Satan in both masculine 
and feminine terms.1 Herein we shall simply suppose (or, assume) that 
presenting God as exclusively masculine is too objectionable and that 
Christians need a solution to the problem of how to speak about God. 
To make a case for our proposed response to the problem, we will 
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offer an elimination argument: we will try to show that none of the 
other possible responses is satisfactory compared to ours.
Of course, this project might seem oddly divorced from conver-
sations about religion in the academy today. After all, relatively few 
feminist theologians or philosophers of religion, for example, are wed-
ded to the notion of Satan, not to mention that plenty of them reject 
the view that there is a transcendent God.2 And though from 1992 to 
1998 five essays appeared in Faith and Philosophy, for example, on the 
question of whether God-talk should be gender-inclusive,3 the debate 
seems now to have fizzled.
Yet there is good reason, we think, to briefly revisit the question at 
this point, since many Christian denominations continue to struggle 
with it—both within and outside the Church. (Consider, for example, 
that the 217th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church [U.S.A.] 
recently voted on a proposal involving gender-inclusive language 
with which to refer to the Trinity.)4 Their struggles are what have led 
us back to the issue, and we shape this essay accordingly. There are 
some significant points of contact between our argument and certain 
sentiments that feminist theologians have voiced over the years, as we 
will indicate with citations here and there particularly in the notes 
below.5 And as it may already be obvious from our rather stiff form 
of presentation, we approach this issue as professional philosophers. 
But our focus herein is on the life of the Church—more specifically, 
those no doubt sizable segments of the Church for which a personal 
God and Satan exist and evangelism matters.6
Since the problem we will take up is largely a practical problem, 
our argument will also be heavily shaped by the demands of reaching 
a practical solution.7 And we will operate on the view that concrete 
problems of everyday living are reason to rework certain theological 
beliefs and one’s approach to ecclesial life. We realize that a view of 
that sort might not seem Christian enough, so we will underscore 
toward the end of this essay that, in fact, it reflects a substantial part 
of Christian thought, represented particularly well in the decidedly 
Wesleyan philosophy of a turn-of-the century American figure, Borden 
Parker Bowne.
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II
Even issues involving pronoun usage, as trifling as they might seem at 
first, stem from far more than just fussiness over the precise shape that 
liturgy takes. And we should start by spelling out what often seems to 
be the concern about presenting God as exclusively masculine. Much 
of this surely is old hat; but it should be made explicit here.
The feminist worry might be expressed with the following argu-
ment:
 (1) The Bible refers to God with mas-
culine pronouns.
 So (2) if I should adopt the linguistic 
practices that the Bible models 
(since the Bible is a true account 
of God and God’s relationship with 
humanity), then I should refer to 
God with masculine pronouns.
 And (3) when I or also my fellow believers 
refer to God with masculine pro-
nouns, I am very strongly prone to 
see God as masculine.8
 Accordingly, (4) when I or also my fellow believers 
refer to God with masculine pro-
nouns, I am very strongly prone to 
see men as collectively more like 
God than women collectively are.
 And accordingly, (5) I am also very strongly prone to see 
men as better than women—par-
ticularly, of course, if I believe that 
God is the standard of goodness. 
(When the masculine is celebrated, 
the feminine is subjugated.9)
 Plus, as a result of all this, (6) if I think that the human beings 
who lead the Church should be 
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the human beings who are most 
like God (who after all is the head 
of the Church)—or, in any case, if 
I think that the human beings who 
lead the Church should be the best 
human beings who can and will 
lead it—then I am strongly prone 
to think the human beings who 
lead the Church should be men.
 And in addition to all this, (7) the less I see God as like myself—or 
at least, the more I see God as far 
less like me than like other human 
beings—the harder it is for me to 
relate to God.
 So (8) if I am a woman and I see God as 
masculine, it is considerably harder 
for me to relate to God than it oth-
erwise would be. Problems arise on 
many levels: psychological, social, 
ecclesial, and even soteriological.10
Herein we neither endorse nor reject this argument. The point is 
just that it seems to represent a common feminist concern.
III
Consider several possible ways in which one might try to solve the 
problem. One way is to simply speak of God in exclusively feminine 
terms,11 reading scripture accordingly: “For God so loved the world 
that she gave her only begotten son.” This might look inviting at first. 
But to make a point which is often overlooked and which is central 
to the argument in this essay: were we to treat God as a “she,” there 
would still be the question of how to refer to Satan. We have four 
options:
[A] treat Satan as exclusively masculine
[B] treat Satan as exclusively feminine
[C] treat Satan as both masculine and feminine
[D] treat Satan as neither masculine nor feminine
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The trouble is that if we took any of these options while talking as 
if God is exclusively feminine, we would stay stuck in essentialism. 
That is, to borrow some language from one scholar, we would talk in 
a way that conduces to the view that there is genuinely a pre-existent 
essence of woman—the view that women have “invariable and fixed 
properties,” a set of shared, distinguishing features, which define what 
they are (Fuss 1989, xi–xii). To keep this essay a reasonable length, we 
will not argue here for the importance of avoiding essentialism. And 
we grant that although anti-essentialism now is the prevailing stance 
in feminist quarters and well beyond, there still is room for debate. 
Yet by now, opponents of essentialism have offered serious enough 
reasons to oppose it, opposition to it is sufficiently common, and the 
conversation about it has gone on long enough that we will take it for 
granted that its defenders have the burden of proof.
The essentialism debates, as they are sometimes called, took place 
among feminists and others during the 1980s and early 1990s. And 
part of the verdict that emerged at the end is that essentialism is false 
because, to quote the same scholar, “a complex system of cultural, 
social, psychical, and historical differences, and not a set of pre-existent 
human essences, position and constitute the subject” (Fuss 1989, 
xii). What is denied is not just that women’s “whatness” is biologically 
determined. Rightly, we think, anti-essentialists indict any suggestion 
that there is some rigidly discrete category of, say, “woman” or “female” 
(or “African-American” or “homosexual”). And the concern is not 
just that the belief that there are categories of that sort is false. The 
concern is also that that belief is dangerous. For example, whenever 
people believe that there is a rigidly discrete category of “woman,” they 
can end up with harmful views of women. And the following point 
is especially important: the idea is that the danger is no less real even 
when at first women are thought to be essentially good or smart, for 
example. Even if the essence of woman is at first presented as quite 
rosy, the view that there is such an essence can always end up hurting 
women. As an illustration, take, for example, the conception of the 
so-called Eternal Feminine in much of Romanticism. Although it was 
often intended to be a flattering portrayal—a testament to feminine 
innocence, purity, and even mystery—it nonetheless gave way to the 
sense that women had certain profound limitations: they were seen 
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as literally too good, too pure, to lower themselves into the messiness 
of existence. Notably, the conception of the Eternal Feminine did not 
arise primarily out of women’s reflections on their own status: for the 
most part, it was a male projection of what the feminine is.
With that in mind, notice what would happen if we took any 
of the options mentioned above while presenting God as exclusively 
feminine. The trouble with taking option [A] or [C] is not just that it 
would be unfair to men. Now, as Christians the two of us think that 
how we treat men does matter—simply because we think it matters 
how everyone is treated, regardless of whether the person is a member 
of an oppressed minority. And if we fret that we hold that view simply 
as a result of being privileged males, we are encouraged in thinking 
that certain feminist theologians have expressed sentiments similar 
to ours on this point. (As one of them puts it, “love is in the peculiar 
position of loving the tiger feeding its crying young as much as it loves 
the bereaved mother of a young gazelle. It must love the murderer as 
well as the victim and his family” (Farley 1990, 78).) Nonetheless, 
perhaps a more common feminist sentiment—understandably—is 
that since women rather than men are the oppressed group, the thing 
to do is to tend to men’s welfare only after women have been fully 
liberated, at least. And both because we are philosophers and because 
we are Christians, we take seriously the possibility that that particular 
feminist sentiment is well-directed.
Even if it is, though, none of the options named above is satis-
factory as a way to treat Satan while presenting God as exclusively 
feminine. In taking option [A], we would risk fostering the impression 
that women are all good and that evil is the province solely of men. 
Taking option [C] might well also give way to the sense that women 
are all good while men corner the market on evil. Neither would we 
help matters much if we went with [D]: doing so still might well 
encourage the view that women are all good and exclusively capable 
of goodness. And [B] would come with its own share of trouble. It 
would paint a picture in which every transcendent figurehead—every 
figurehead in the divine realm—is exclusively feminine: transcendence 
is the province solely of the splendorous feminine. Surely, that picture 
would be at least as dangerous as an image in which the feminine is 
all good and only the feminine is good.
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The lesson is this: As an attempt to solve the problem we are con-
cerned with here, the strategy of treating God as exclusively feminine 
is simply too problematic.
IV
Another possible response to the problem is to give up on referring 
to God with any pronouns and speak simply of “God” and “God-
self.” One snag, though, is that because of a long Christian history of 
encouraging the view that God is masculine, perhaps people are too 
prone to associate masculinity with the term ‘God.’12
And we suspect that there would be a much deeper problem 
with eliminating all pronominal references to God. At best, it would 
make our talk about God pretty ungainly. It would be cumbersome 
enough to say: “For God so loved the world that God gave God’s only 
begotten son,” and it would sound even odder if instead of saying, for 
example, “God wants to draw you closer to himself,” we exclaimed, 
“God wants to draw you closer to Godself.” (Still worse might be the 
new rendition of Genesis 22.8: “Abraham answered, ‘God Godself will 
provide the lamb for the burnt offering, my son.’”13) This awkwardness 
is no incidental thing, since our posture toward God is supposed to 
be reverential, and our testimony and witness need to be compelling. 
Talk of this sort would threaten to be a serious obstacle to reverence 
and compelling testimony.
Far more important, it would also come precariously close to 
presenting God as more of a principle, for example, than a person. 
Perhaps somewhere there are or will be human beings who can read-
ily see personhood even where there is no gendered identity. But to 
put it simply, most human beings in most of the world today are not 
human beings of that sort. In fact, most of us today are simply not 
up the task of conceiving of a genderless person: as a practical matter, 
for us the task is on the order of trying to conceive of a square circle. 
(Even transgendered persons, as we see them, are gendered, though 
neither as exclusively masculine nor as exclusively feminine.) As a result, 
an intimate relationship with a Divine Person who is supposed to be 
genderless is beyond our reach. For all intents and purposes, if for us 
there is no Divine Mother or Father, for example, but only an enigmatic 
“Godself,” there is no Divine Person, and if there is no Divine Person, 
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there is no intimate relationship with God of the sort that Christians 
prize. So at least as long as evangelism matters, presenting God as 
genderless would be counterproductive, even for believers who already 
have an intimate relationship with a genderless God. We do think that 
speaking just of “God” and “Godself ” is viable within conversation 
among professional theologians and philosophers, for example (since 
they have had a chance to cultivate the life of the mind enough to be 
particularly attuned to the need for gender-inclusive God-talk and to 
grow especially practiced at accommodating that need). But of course, 
not all conversation is conversation of that sort.
For that matter, all told, the difficulty involves far more than just 
the constraints of modern-day languages. As long as there are listeners 
who can conceive of persons only as gendered, talk of a personal God 
will give way to notions of a gendered God, even if talk of a personal 
God is devoid of gendered pronouns. And imagery, for example, used 
to describe the Divine will lead to one impression or another about 
what God’s particular gender is—in other words, God will look mas-
culine, feminine, or somewhere in between—even if we try to wipe 
gender out of the pictures we paint. (In cultures in which strength is 
typically associated with masculinity, for example, highlighting God’s 
power will tend to have a predictable result.)14 So the problem we are 
concerned with here would still be plenty troublesome even if, say, 
English, French, and German gave us strictly non-gendered pronouns 
with which to refer to persons (instead of ‘he,’ ‘she,’ ‘il,’ ‘elle,’ ‘er,’ ‘sie,’ 
and so on). And in any case, eliminating pronominal references to 
God would be insufficient as a remedy. It would still leave us with 
the question: How will we speak of God—in masculine terms, in 
feminine terms, or both?
V
We have discussed a couple of possible ways to try to solve the problem 
we have been considering, and in light of what we have said about 
their shortcomings the main advantages of our corrective should be 
easy enough to see. On the one hand, referring not only to God but 
also to Satan with both masculine and feminine pronouns would spare 
us from the consequences of treating God and Satan as exclusively 
masculine. And on the other hand, out of all known possible remedies 
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that would not get in the way of a personal relationship with God, 
our corrective comes the closest to measuring up to anti-essentialist 
standards insofar as it would be the least conducive to essentialist 
views of women.
Without question, the option we propose would leave certain 
problems unsolved. At the least, it would do nothing to directly chal-
lenge the view that to be masculine is to be rational, strong, and so 
forth, whereas to be feminine is to be emotional, seductive, and so on. 
But there are only so many problems one can solve here at one time, 
so if what we propose is the best possible corrective to the problem 
in focus here, that should be enough.
One might also worry that in using feminine, as well as mas-
culine, pronouns to refer to God and Satan, we would stray too far 
from Christian doctrine. Yet our proposal is far less contentious on 
that front than it might at first seem. Surely, it is safe enough to say 
that gender and the language that denotes it is socially constructed to 
such an extent that none of that language can describe very accurately 
a trait that God or Satan has. Sex—as in “male” and “female”—is not 
socially constructed, of course. But to put it bluntly, since neither 
God nor Satan has a body, neither of them has male or female sexual 
organs. And since, in the final estimation, none of our personal pro-
nouns can describe God or Satan very accurately, and if the feminist 
concern we have talked about is well-directed, we might as well opt 
for the pronouns that can solve the problem: this is one case is which 
a pragmatist sort of move is warranted.
Nonetheless, pragmatist moves can leave a believer nervous. (We, 
at least, are not prone to make them often.) So it is worth emphasizing 
that we are hardly on our own in taking an approach of this sort to 
the kind of practical problem we have been considering. Moreover, 
we should note that we are in particularly good company by Wesleyan 
standards, for example. This is not the place, of course, for a sweeping 
survey of Christian or Wesleyan thought. But to give some indication 
that our proposal is in line with a substantial part of both, we want 
to end this essay with a look at one particularly influential “child 
of the Wesleyan tradition,” as he has been called (Langford 1983, 
121)—Borden Parker Bowne (1847–1910). Bowne was a devout 
Methodist philosopher and preeminent leader in his church15 who 
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taught at Boston University and founded the Boston Personalist 
tradition in philosophy and theology, a tradition which heavily em-
phasizes the importance of persons. (Central to Boston Personalism, 
for example, is the view that God is a person.)16 For awhile, Bowne 
and his Boston Personalist tradition played a sizable role in American 
Christianity in general.17
There is a deeply practical bent in all of Bowne’s work, and where 
Christianity is concerned he focuses most heavily on practice. It is 
very much in character that he says in one essay: “Our real faith is 
not the formula we repeat, but the principles by which we live. We 
may be practical atheists while professing faith in God, and veritable 
heathen while claiming to be Christians. And when the theological 
formula is correct, we may miss the spiritual truths” (Bowne 1910e, 
184). In Bowne’s view, far and away the highest priority that Chris-
tians should have as Christians is to live righteously. On one occasion 
(Bowne 1910d), he even calls righteousness “the essence of religion,” 
and, returning to a theme that surfaces often in his writings,18 he 
maintains that “whatever our theological faith, whatever our religious 
practices, and whatever our religious pedagogics, their sole use and 
value consist in helping us to lives of love and righteousness before 
God and man. This is that for which they exist and that which gives 
them meaning and justification” (Bowne 1910d, 75–6). Elsewhere 
he warns that “the Churches whose creeds are speculatively the most 
elaborate have never been the most efficient in turning from darkness 
to light” (Bowne 1981e, 177–8). And he thinks that if there is any 
value in mystical experiences, for example—meaning experiences in 
which one believes one has unmediated contact with the divine—their 
value is purely instrumental: the only purpose of direct contact with 
God is, or would be, moral improvement (see, e.g., Bowne 1910d, 86; 
1899, 83). For Bowne, lofty metaphysical dreams, swelling passions, 
sentimentality, and even religious ecstasy must not get in the way of 
hard-nosed discipline and a rapt attention to ethical responsibility.19 
His emphasis on the importance of righteousness pervades even his 
soteriology (see, e.g., Bowne 1903, 74; 1899, 56–7, 59). And in one 
essay, he goes so far as to claim that in the event of a conflict between 
“faith and morals,” as he puts it, “humanity can better dispense with 
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the former than with the latter” (Bowne 1981a, 174). In Bowne’s 
Christianity, achieving ethical ends is by far the primary concern.20
We should add that what he advocates in the name of Christianity 
is not “mere ethics,” to use his language again (e.g., Bowne 1910d, 85; 
1903, 74). For example, he claims not only that righteousness is the 
essence of religion, but also that a certain sort of prayer is—namely, 
the sort which is “essentially the attempt to find God, to have com-
munion with him, to relate our life with all its contents to the divine 
plan, and to subordinate our life to the divine will” (Bowne 1910c, 
132–3). And though Bowne often says that “obedience is the only test 
of discipleship” (Bowne 1903, 74; cf. 1910b; 1910d, 79, 92; 1899, 
84, 97; 1898a, passim), he is quick to stress that “the Lord looketh at 
the heart” (Bowne 1898a, 104–5; cf. 1981a, 175; 1910c, 144): for 
Bowne, true obedience surely involves more than just an outward 
display of following God’s commandments. In a more philosophical 
mode, he also fuses a utilitarian stress on good consequences, on the 
one hand, with a deontological emphasis on willing what is right, on 
the other hand—claiming not only that how good or bad an action is 
depends on what its consequences are, but also that how good or bad 
persons are hinges on their motives (Bowne 1892, 34; see especially 
1981c; and cf. Beauchamp 1997, 79). In the picture he paints, con-
science tells us only what we should aim to achieve: in order to figure 
out how best to achieve it, we must use reason (see especially Bowne 
1981c, 76, 78). When we fail to make an earnest effort to bring about 
what conscience calls for, we are guilty of wrongdoing; but when we 
choose an ineffective way of trying to bring it about, we simply make 
a mistake (see Bowne 1899, 41; 1892, 34).
Nonetheless, mistakes matter, in Bowne’s view, because we need 
to make the world a better place. And he sees the life of righteousness 
as a life aimed at improving the world. He writes characteristically, for 
example: “Not formal moral correctness, but vital fullness, is the deep-
est aim in life” (Bowne 1981d, 83). That is, most of all we must seek 
“the development of the great social forms, the educational facilities, 
the gathered knowledge, the industrial activities, the wise cooperation 
and organization, and the stored wealth without which humanity 
cannot progress” (1981d, 82–3). Social justice also is a crucial part of 
what Bowne urges, and here it is worth noting that he was relatively 
254 Simmons and Marshall: Revisiting Gender-Inclusive God-Talk
feminist for his day and age. Just for example, to quote a comment 
that appeared in the Boston Evening Transcript (6 April 1910) five days 
after his death, his satire was “never quite so sharp and hot as when 
he was dealing with the opponents of woman suffrage” (quoted in 
Steinkraus 1981, v, and attributed to Edwin T. Mead).21
In Bowne’s estimation, at any rate, the humble prayer of a righteous 
man needs to avail much (cf., e.g., Bowne 1910e, 181; 1909, 329–30; 
1899, 106; 1898b, 376, 382; 1892, vii, 36, 40, 76)—and the need is 
so great that even prayer (see especially Bowne 1910c, 131–2, 146) 
and even metaphysics should be, above all else, instruments geared to 
promote the righteous living that can bring about progress. Remark-
ably, Bowne claimed that it matters relatively little whether there is 
a correspondence—in the stricter senses of the term—between the 
conclusions that metaphysical speculation yields and what absolutely 
exists (see especially Bowne 1882, 12). For him, the value of metaphys-
ics lay solely in its pragmatic functions.22
Of course, our claim is not that Bowne got all of this right. It 
suffices to say that his version of Wesleyanism holds a respectable 
place in Christian thought and that, like us, he operated on the view 
that concrete problems of everyday living are reason to rework certain 
theological beliefs and one’s approach to ecclesial life. Nonetheless, 
that point is worth stressing here, in case we have seemed too willing 
to sacrifice the integrity of Christian doctrine in responding to the 
particular problem we have considered. That problem, again, calls for a 
practical solution. And in the end, making a relatively small change in 
our linguistic practices is worthwhile if it can enhance what Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1954) aptly called our life together.23
Notes
1. We use the term “feminine” only in the very broadest sense. We realize that terms 
of that sort may well be problematic in certain contexts, at least. (See, e.g., Daly 
1978, 68, emphasis in the original: “[Femininity has] essentially nothing to do with 
femaleness.” Cf., e.g., Greer 1970, 90.) Here and in similar cases below, we opt 
for the term “feminine” instead of “female,” e.g., simply because “female” seems 
better suited for denoting sex than for denoting gender.
2. E.g., even alone Heyward’s definition makes it easy to imagine that she rejects that 
view: “God is our power in mutual relation” (Heyward 1989, 188). Throughout 
this essay, all we mean by “feminism” is, to borrow Blackburn’s aptly wide defini-
tion, “the approach to social life, philosophy, and ethics that commits itself to 
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correcting biases leading to the subordination of women or the disparagement 
of women’s particular experience” (Blackburn 1996, 137).
3. See Dell’Olio 1998; Ishan 1996; Hook and Kimel 1995; Harper 1994; and 
Johnson 1992. Dell’Olio, Ishan, and Johnson endorse gender-inclusive God-talk, 
particularly God-talk which refers to God as “mother.” In contrast, Hook and 
Kimel, along with Harper, think we should refer to God in exclusively masculine 
terms.
4. See, on the PCUSA website, http://www.pcusa.org/ga217/newsandphotos/
ga06086.htm, which includes a link to the paper (“The Trinity: God’s Love 
Overflowing”) that the Assembly voted to “receive and commend to the church 
for study”: http://www.pcusa.org/theologyandworship/issues/trinityfinal.pdf.
5. At the least, comments such as the following in Pippin 1996, 314, are quite no-
table: “Some recent feminist readings question the . . . value of [representing] evil 
in a female body and character and the connection of evil with female sexuality.” 
(Pippin 1996 includes some other relevant bibliographical information.) Insofar 
as we focus on the life of certain segments of the Church, the sorts of feminist 
concerns we concentrate on here are, e.g., more like Dorothee Sölle’s than those of 
Mary Daly, who professes to have left Christianity (see, e.g., Sölle 1990, 74).
6. We also look just at those segments of the Church that use only languages such as 
English, French, and German in which there are gendered pronouns with which 
to refer to persons.
7. At times below, we also use certain religious language which, for its lack of clarity 
(i.e., precision, determinacy), we would avoid in other contexts.
8. Particularly worth considering here is Daly 1973, 17–8: “Sophisticated thinkers, 
of course, have never intellectually identified God with a Superfather in heaven. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that even when very abstract conceptu-
alizations of God are formulated in the mind, images survive in the imagination 
in such a way that a person can function on two different and even apparently 
contradictory levels at the same time. Thus one can speak of God as spirit and 
at the same time imagine ‘him’ as belonging to the male sex.” In a note here 
(201n.10), Daly quotes a remarkable line from McKenzie 1956, 93–4: “God is 
of course masculine, but not in the sense of sexual distinction.” And Daly con-
tinues: “Such primitive images can profoundly affect conceptualizations which 
appear to be very refined and abstract.” Cf., e.g., Inclusive-Language Lectionary 
Committee 1984.
9. See especially Daly 1973, 19: “If God is male, then the male is God. The divine 
patriarch castrates women as long as he is allowed to live on in the human imagi-
nation.” And cf., e.g., Sölle 1990, 69–76; Ruether 1989, 151: “Male monotheism 
reinforces the social hierarchy of patriarchal rule through its religious system in 
a way that was not the case with the paired images of God and Goddess. God 
is modeled after the patriarchal ruling class and is seen as addressing this class 
of males directly, adopting them as his ‘sons.’ They are his representatives, the 
responsible partners of covenant with him. Women as wives now become sym-
bolically repressed as the dependent servant class. Wives, along with children and 
servants, represent those ruled over and owned by the patriarchal class. They relate 
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to man as he relates to God. A symbolic hierarchy is set up: God-male-female. 
Women no longer stand in direct relation to God; they are connected to God 
secondarily, through the male. This hierarchical order is evident in the structure 
of patriarchal law in the Old Testament, in which only the male heads of families 
are addressed directly. Women, children, and servants are referred to indirectly 
through their duties and property relations to the patriarch [citing Bird 1974]. 
. . . Male monotheism becomes the vehicle of a psychocultural revolution of the 
male ruling class in its relationship to surrounding reality”; Schneiders 1989, 65: 
“The Bible was written in a patriarchal society by the people, mostly men, whom 
that system kept on top. It embodies the androcentric, that is, male-centered, 
presuppositions of that social world, and it legitimates the patriarchal, that is, 
male-dominant, social structures that held that world together. Its language is 
overwhelmingly male-oriented, both in reference to God and in reference to 
people. In short, the Bible is a book written by men in order to tell their story 
for their advantage. As such, it confronts both women and justice-inspired men 
with an enormous problem.” Cf. also Nothwehr 1998, 93, which includes some 
other relevant bibliographical information.
10. Something of this point may underlie Ruether’s (1983; 1981) question, “Can a 
male saviour save women?” e.g. Cf., e.g., Schneiders 1989, 66: “Language is that 
by which we construe and construct our world. To the extent that women are 
invisible in biblical language, they are nonparticipants in the biblical construction 
of reality.”
11. One can take this sort of move even farther—as far as Gately 1993 (which is cited 
approvingly in a string of mainstream essays in feminist theology). But presum-
ably Gately leaves us without a personal God. And for reasons discussed below, 
we need for God to be a person.
12. No doubt, the concern that they are has driven a lot of the “Goddess thealogy” 
developed by feminist theologians. There is some indication of this in Eller 1996, 
e.g., which includes some other relevant bibliographical information. “Thealogy” 
is the chosen spelling, incidentally.
13. The NIV translation is the one modified here.
14. How masculine or feminine God looks to me in one image or another depends in 
large part upon how gender is conceived in my particular culture. Plus, presum-
ably it also depends upon the traits I, in particular, associate with the men I have 
known versus the women I have known. So we should mention that in making 
the most effective use of the sort of God-talk we advocate—whether making the 
most effective use of it in a sermon or in one-on-one conversation, e.g.—perhaps 
one would tailor one’s imagery to one’s particular audience at least to some degree 
(mixing images in which God is most likely to look feminine to that audience, on 
the one hand, with images in which God is most likely to look masculine to that 
audience, on the other hand; in connection with all this, worth considering is 
Campbell and Burns 2004, e.g., on Wesleyanism within a multicultural society). 
Nonetheless, we suspect that alternating between masculine and feminine pronouns 
in referring to God could do the lion’s share of the work against essentialism.
15. See, e.g., Hutchison 1971, 407, with n.1.
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16. A clear account of what the term ‘personalism’ means for Boston Personalists is 
hard to come by—not surprisingly, since so is a clear definition of ‘person’ that 
measures up to their standards (cf., e.g., Lavely 2002, xix). For some relevant 
accounts of what ‘personalism’ means, see, e.g., Kohák 1997, especially 11: 
“Most fundamentally, personalism is a philosophy committed to the primacy of 
person-al (subject-related) categories of value and meaning, to the mutual respect 
of all beings in a reality experienced as a community of persons who are convinced 
that subject-related categories are subjectival, not subjective in the sense of being 
private and arbitrary”; Lavely 1991; Deats 1986, especially 2 (a revision of a line 
in Lavely 1967, 107): “Personalism is a philosophical perspective for which the 
person is the ontological ultimate and for which personality is the fundamental 
explanatory principle.” Also worth considering is Bengtsson 2006, 31–4, 49–53, 
54n.76, 61. And see especially Lavely 1991; Deats 1986, 2n.3 for some other 
relevant bibliographical information. For bibliographical details related to Bowne 
and to Boston Personalism in general, see first and foremost Gacka 1994, 25–86; 
Bowne 1981f, 198–215.
17. E.g., as late as 1936, Wieman and Meland (1936, 134) could still declare that 
Bowne’s thinking “has probably reached the minds of more professing Christian 
people than any other philosophy of religion in the United States.” Fosdick 
(1956) said that “reading Bowne saved his intellectual life” (Trotter 1986, 18). 
And Martin Luther King, Jr., who studied philosophy and theology at Boston 
University under two of Bowne’s chief successors (Edgar Sheffield Brightman and 
Harold DeWolf ), described Boston Personalism as a pivotal resource for his social 
thought and action: “It was mainly under these teachers that I studied personalistic 
philosophy—the theory that the clue to the meaning of ultimate reality is found in 
personality. This personal idealism remains today my basic philosophic position. 
Personalism’s insistence that only personality—finite and infinite—is ultimately 
real strengthened me in two convictions: it gave me metaphysical grounding for 
the idea of a personal God, and it gave me a metaphysical basis for the dignity and 
worth of all human personality” (1958, 100). On Boston Personalism’s connec-
tions with King’s social thought and action, see Deats 1986, 7–8; Muelder 1986, 
245–6, 247; 1977; Ansbro 1982; Smith and Zepp 1975; Lewis 1970, though 
note that Cone (1986; 1984) and Raboteau (1988) argue that decidedly “white” 
traditions such as Boston Personalism had far less influence on King than it has 
often been thought. No doubt, Bownean personalism was especially influential 
among Wesleyans in particular, which makes a lot of sense in light of how much 
it has in common with Wesleyanism. See, e.g., Oord 2002, 117–20.
18. Cf., e.g., Bowne 1910d, 81; 1981a, 175: “The end of the law is love. The pur-
pose for which the whole machinery of religion exists is to elevate those natural 
sanctities which God has planted in the human heart into controlling and abiding 
principles. Not to make us partakers of an alien holiness, but to create within us a 
pure heart and a clean one is the aim of the Gospel”; 1981b, 175, where Bowne 
says that faith is meant “to supplement [‘the moralities’], to aid their growth”; 
1898a, 105; 1878. Consider also, e.g., the extent to which Eucken 1915, 25 and 
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Pyle 1910, e.g., 189, testify to how important a role this sort of view played in 
Bowne’s thought.
19. He does not reject mysticism wholesale: he leaves open the possibility that hu-
man beings can directly encounter God (e.g., 1899, 82–3), thus distinguishing 
himself from Kant (1979, 63), e.g. Contrast also Bertocci (1951, 82–120), one 
of Bowne’s main successors within Boston Personalism. Yet Bowne wants to test 
the value (and authenticity) of mystical experiences by judging whether they bring 
with them an “increase of moral and religious effectiveness” and thus “practical 
significance” (Bowne 1899, 83). Plus, he is far more prone than, say, his friend 
William James (1961, 21–38) to discount particular mystical experiences as “purely 
neurological or pathological [‘disturbances’]” (Bowne 1903, 75; see, e.g., Bowne 
1899, 9–10, 61, 91, and especially 102–3). Further, at times Bowne qualifies his 
denouncements of emotionalism (e.g., 1899, 90; 1892, 44–5), e.g.—but only 
lightly and briskly. And his distrust of fervor (which, e.g., 1903, 74–5 evinces) 
goes hand in hand with his caution toward human sentiments (see, e.g., 1909, 
329; 1892, viii, 44–5, 78). Granted, he sees authentic faith as a direct product of 
either sentiment or moral willing rather than logical inference (see, e.g., Bowne 
1910e, 181; cf. especially Anderson 1990, 109–12, 114–6). Nonetheless, he 
maintains that the “religious ideal must always include the cognitive . . . ideal” 
as a “barrier against superstition” (Bowne 1981b, 164), and he also aims to guard 
against claims of spiritual authority on the basis of feeling or mystical experi-
ences. To find a possible motivation behind all this, see, e.g., Bowne 1903, 74, 
and Bowne 1899, 31–2, with McConnell 1929, 211.
20. For discussion of a comparable feature of Wesley’s own thought, see, e.g., Mar-
quardt 1992. 
21. See also, e.g., Bowne 1892, 241–3 on the “ludicrous inapplicability” of the bibli-
cal claims (Colossians 3.18; Ephesians 5.22–24; 1 Peter 3.1) that the husband 
should have authority over the wife. Though scripture does matter for Bowne, 
he thinks conscience, informed by reason (see Marshall 2002a; 2002b, 25–6), 
must be the final judge: it should be the standard by which to judge scripture, 
rather than scripture the standard by which to judge moral action (cf., e.g., Pyle 
1910, 195). See, e.g., Bowne 1898a, 92: “In general, the progress in theology has 
consisted in adjusting readings to those fundamental principles of good sense and 
good morals to which revelation must conform, if it is to be of any value for us.” 
Plus, cf. Bowne 1899, 34–5, with Isaiah 29.16 and 45.9. And on the atonement, 
see especially Bowne 1900, though also, e.g., Bowne 1899, 58, 75–7. See also 
Bowne 1981a, 174, on how, in Bowne’s view, the Pauline letters and the Gospel 
of John, versus all the other parts of scripture, fare in relation to various human 
natures.
22. For the full evidence for this, see Marshall 2002a, 657–9; 2002b. One of Bowne’s 
students represented him well in saying that “need—spiritual need [sic] is the mother 
of the personal and true God” (Pyle 1910, 196–7, emphasis in the original). 
And it is no wonder that Bowne thought the best metaphysical medicine was a 
compelling argument that there is a God who is a person. After all, on the one 
hand, he must have seen how difficult it can be to make sense of what prayer is 
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unless it is directed at a person. (Cf., e.g., the passage quoted in Oord 2002, 118, 
in which Brightman (1943, 62–3), Bowne’s main protégé, points plainly enough 
to the difficulty.) On the other hand—e.g.—he agreed with a view he attributed 
to John Stuart Mill: “Goodness in God must be the same as goodness in man!” 
(1981c, 77). And it is easy enough to see why, particularly if, as Bowne wrote, 
“the fundamental aim is to reproduce Christ in the disciple” (1898a, 105)—i.e., 
especially if we are to seek righteousness by imitating the goodness of God.
23. Thanks to Scott Aikin, Doug Harper, John Marshall, and the audience at the 
2007 meeting of the Wesleyan Theological Society for comments on earlier ver-
sions of this essay.
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